INTRODUCTION
Throughout the United States low-income families are having an increasingly difficult time finding an affordable place to live.
1
Due to high rents, static incomes, and a shortage of housing, local communities, particularly in urban areas, are struggling to fight off this wave of decline and displacement.
2 Currently in the United States an estimated 12 million families are now spending more than half of their income on rent. A large reason for low-income families' overspending in this way is that the supply of affordable housing is shrinking.
5
Landlords and tenants are both adding to the affordable housing problem as "all sides are being squeezed." 6 Today most new construction of rental housing is for the high-end market,
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EMINENT DOMAIN

A. Doctrinal Establishment of Eminent Domain
In the United States, the federal government's power of eminent domain has long been used to acquire property for public use and was directly attributed to its rights as a sovereignty. 8 Presuming a government's right to acquire land as an exercise of its sovereignty, the United States Constitution regulated the exercise of such a right by attaching a responsibility to the government to justly compensate the land owner for the fair market value of the property. Thus the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 10 The first challenge to the federal government's eminent domain power came in 1876 in Kohl v. United States. In Kohl, the Court found that the right of eminent domain exists in the federal government of the United States, and may be exercised by it within the States so far as is necessary to the enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.
11
The Court opined that " [t] he right [of eminent domain] is the offspring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty." 12 The Court continued: [i] f the right to acquire property for such uses may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of property holders to sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting a sale to the Federal government, the constitutional grants of power may be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent for its practical existence upon the will of a State, or even upon that of a private citizen. This cannot be. 13 The Court further articulated that the proper view of the right of eminent domain is as a right belonging to the federal government under its power as a sovereignty to take private property for its own public uses and not for those of another, 14 and that the right includes both the exercise by purchase or condemnation. 403, 406 (1879) 
B. Eminent Domain for Redevelopment
Many decades later, in Berman v. Parker, the Court first tackled a challenge to the constitutionality of whether redevelopment was a public purpose falling within the acceptable uses of the federal government's exercise of eminent domain. The Court found that a legislative act, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, was constitutional as applied regarding the use of eminent domain pursuant to a comprehensive development plan for the redevelopment of a large area to eliminate and prevent slum and substandard housing conditions. 16 The Court found that " [m] iserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden." 17 Ultimately, the Court determined that the role of the judiciary in determining whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised for a public purpose is "an extremely narrow one" 18 and that it should be within the purview of the legislature to determine that a community should be "beautiful as well as healthy, [and] spacious as well as clean. . . ." 19 Therefore, the Court found that "[t]he concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive" and that redevelopment of slums and blighted communities properly fits into the constraints to when a government may use eminent domain.
20
Along with determining that redevelopment of blighted areas fits within the constitutional responsibility applied toward governments, the Court also extended the use of eminent domain further than to just those properties that were blighted, finding that "community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis-lot by lot, building by building." 21 The Court reasoned that if an individual owner was "permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was not being used against the public interest, integrated plans for 16 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954 Under the legislature's decision, the entire area within the redevelopment zone needed redesigning "so that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed for the region." 23 Essentially, the Court allowed the taking of non-blighted properties to fit within the design of the redevelopment area under a completely heightened sense of judicial deference toward exercises of eminent domain.
C. A New Level of Judicial Deference
The heightened level of deference given to legislatures over exercises of eminent domain seemed to reach a climax in the landmark case of Kelo v. City of New London, where eminent domain for a public purpose was not limited to the redevelopment of slums and blighted areas within a zone for residential purposes, but instead permitted for the initiative of economic development of the surrounding areas, which the Court deemed a public purpose. In Kelo, the city of New London approved a redevelopment plan submitted by a development agent to revitalize an area along the waterfront in the city.
24
The plan called for the use of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of currently owned property in the redevelopment zone that was unable to be purchased on the open market. 25 The Court found that the redevelopment plan served the public purpose of economic rejuvenation, which constituted a public use under the Fifth Amendment and was therefore entitled to judicial deference.
Kennedy reasoned that "[q]uite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties," 29 and it cannot be said "that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects." 30 The Court found that "[i]t is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics that matters in determining public use."
31
In reasoning to defend its heightened deference, the Court articulated that "our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power."
32
According to the majority, " [t] he City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community . . ." 33 and that promoting economic development is a "traditional and long accepted function of government."
34
D. Post-Kelo Reactions Towards the Use of Eminent Domain
While the Supreme Court in Kelo stressed a high level of judicial deference to public use jurisprudence, the Court explicitly left the door open to states to place further restrictions on the exercise of takings power by governments within their state sovereignty.
35
As a result, many states have scaled back the perceived power granted to local governments over the exercise of their eminent domain power from the Court in Kelo. For example, in California, a city may only take land for economic development purposes in blighted areas.
36
In Florida, any political subdivision authorized with the power of eminent domain "may not exercise the power of eminent domain to take private property for the purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or 229, 244 (1984) ); see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36 ("Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch."). Going further than a majority of the states, the Florida legislature overtly objected to the Court's reasoning in Berman and invalidated the use of eminent domain for eliminating slum or blight conditions as a valid public purpose or use for which private property may be taken.
38
Pennsylvania occupies a middle ground between Florida and California, developed after Kelo, where a condemnor is authorized to use eminent domain on multiple units within a redevelopment area only if a majority of the units of property fall under certain conditions to be deemed blighted under statute.
39
Such conditions include property that is: (1) declared a public nuisance; (2) an attractive nuisance to children; (3) a "dilapidated, unsanitary, unsafe vermin-infested" or failing under the building code; (4) a fire hazard; (5) tax delinquent for a period of two years; (6) This has created economic problems for cities due to the fact that the impact that an affordable housing shortage can have on the economic vitality of a city is directly correlated to the potential disruptions in the labor pool that a shortage of housing can have on low income workers who would not be able to live and thereby work in the cities from which they were displaced.
48
This seemingly 44 Matthew J. Parlow, Unintended Consequences: Eminent Domain and Affordable Housing, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 842 (2006) . 45 Id.; see also id. at 856-57 ("Not only do cities fail to use their eminent domain power to build more affordable housing units, but they often use their power to raze them. Cities often take property that has existing affordable housing units owned and operated by private owners. These units are oftentimes inexpensive, private-sector housing that do not have ties to government-subsidy programs. They are, nevertheless, 'affordable' housing units in the sense that low-income residents can afford to rent them and live within the city. By taking such affordable housing units off the market by their exercise of eminent domain power, cities reduce the available housing stock for low-income residents as such units are usually replaced by new high-end commercial, residential, and mixed-use projects."). 46 forced exodus of low-income workers could wreak havoc on the daily operations of businesses within a city who depend on a labor pool willing to work for modest wages.
49
Under the current, broader view of the public use doctrine exemplified in Kelo, "the government may take private property and transfer it to another private party as long as the use will serve a public purpose."
50
Public purposes including the creation of jobs, economic development, and the "revitalization of blighted areas." 51 This public purpose justification "encourages exercises of eminent domain power that not only stymies efforts to increase affordable housing, but that actually reduce existing affordable housing stock."
52
The fact of the matter is that cities need the private sector's assistance in building and managing housing projects. Still, a fear remains, particularly among legal scholars, that due to a proven history of cities using their eminent domain powers to benefit only private interests, engaging with the private sector will come at the cost of further hurting lower-income residents.
It is often argued that the "government's current wide-ranging power to condemn housing via blight removal projects can have significant longlasting effects on the low-income people who are disproportionately affected by these projects." 53 Yet, because local governments "receive a significant portion of their budget through sales and property taxes" they are therefore more likely "to advance projects that will increase such revenue" 54 rather than focus their attention on projects that emphasize benefiting their lowincome residents. This relative distrust in local government's ability to use their eminent domain power to promote the development of affordable housing is largely found in the contention that " [o] pportunities to create affordable housing . . . tend not to create new sales tax revenue and they do not maximize the potential property taxes that can be generated from a new development." 55 Therefore, the generalized incentive for local governments to exercise their eminent domain power to increase taxable revenues directly competes with the promotion of affordable housing. As this Note will go on to elaborate, the incentive for local governments to increase redevelopment to promote their tax base ends up with ineffective results. Therefore, if local governments' purpose for using eminent domain to incentivize development is for tax generating purposes, then those incentives will prove unsuccessful. However, it is incorrect to conclude that it is impossible to use eminent domain for promoting affordable housing. Rather local governments need only to refocus their power of eminent domain in a more effective way.
A. The Rise and Spread of Urban Decline
Cities such as Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and Pittsburgh have all lost "more than 40 percent of their populations over the last four decades." 57 Urban decline occurs "when low [citywide] housing demand leads to population loss in the lowest-price neighborhoods, and falling prices allow lower-income households to move into formerly middle-income neighborhoods. As this happens, housing prices in those middle neighborhoods fall." 58 Concurrent with this decline, these cities have also seen "income growth in the top three housing-price deciles" within certain neighborhoods. 59 Therefore, when higher-income residents move in, they are more likely to make improvements to the housing stock of that neighborhood, 60 whereas when lower-income residents move in, "they may be more likely to defer home maintenance when finances are tight." 61 This creates a push-pull effect where cities are seeing "retreating boundaries of high income" neighborhoods as urban decline spreads throughout the remaining lower and middle-income neighborhoods.
62
In discussions regarding the affordable housing problem in the United States, one term often thrown around is gentrification. Simply put, " [g] Instead, "at the aggregate level [,] movers out of gentrifying neighborhoods are no more likely to move to lower-income neighborhoods compared with those from non-gentrifying, low-income neighborhoods." 65 Nevertheless, while low income families are not necessarily more likely to move from gentrifying neighborhoods than similar residents in nongentrifying neighborhoods, the fact remains that lowincome families "have a higher risk of downward mobility" when they do move out of gentrifying neighborhoods.
66
This creates a spread of urban decline which reaches into once middle-income neighborhoods and results in the retreating boundaries of high-income neighborhoods and the decline of home values across the large swaths of growing disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Land values are usually calculated based on their "physical and locational attributes," and what is often neglected "is the bundle of legal rights conveyed with land." 67 A component of the land value calculation are the options that a potential buyer has for their property. To better understand the option component of urban land values:
[r]eal option theory implies that [1] raw land contains an option to develop the optimal structure at the optimal time (development option), [2] developed land contains an option to redevelop the existing improvements to a higher and better use (redevelopment option), and [3] both raw and developed land contain an option to sell or completely abandon the property (abandonment option). 68 Therefore, for a newly constructed property, the presumption is that its value reflects that it has been built to its most valuable, optimal use. Thus, since 63 However, over years when physical deterioration and obsolescence start to set in, the property value and "best use value" begin to inverse-for as the property value begins to depreciate, the redevelopment option value begins to increase.
70
This cycle eventually leads to the property being far removed from its "best use" potential, and its current property value is then comprised almost entirely of its land value, which is in turn a direct reflection of its redevelopment option value.
71
Research indicates that prior improvements on properties purchased with the sole intent to immediately tear down do not contribute to the price of the property during sale.
72
Instead it was solely land value and its associated redevelopment option that was being valued on the market. This ultimately demonstrates the rise of urban decline in many communities around the United States. Many local communities "lack sufficient incentives for redevelopment indicating little to no option value is observed."
73
In fact, "the redevelopment option value is estimated to be around 4% of a property's selling price on average." 74 Thus, with little redevelopment option factored into the value of housing in unincentivized areas, urban decline spreads throughout low and middle income areas of the community as home values in those areas are seemingly being valued for only their land. In the end, this demonstrates that for local governments to curtail the spread of urban decline in their cities, they must find ways to promote incentives for redevelopment in areas throughout their locale including, but not exclusively, the potential exercise of eminent domain. Declining home values can promote more market development, but the push-pull dynamic in the market is eroding the middle of the housing-price-spectrum and creating a market with only two subsections-luxury high end, and everything else. This is the reason why only luxury units are being built today, which in turn exacerbates the spread of urban decline and the problem of affordable housing. 
III. CURRENT TOOLS EMPLOYED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO INCENTIVIZE DEVELOPMENT
When trying to incentivize development, local governments have employed many tools over the years besides eminent domain, with varied to little success. A quick survey of some of the tools most frequently used will demonstrate their past effectiveness (or lack thereof) as potential affordable housing solutions.
A. Inclusionary Zoning
Inclusionary zoning programs "either require developers to make a certain percentage of the units within their market-rate residential developments available at prices or rents that are affordable to specified income groups, or offer incentives that encourage them to do so."
75
Advocates for such inclusionary zoning policies, including many legal scholars, argue that they can be "an effective means of producing belowmarket-rate units that would not otherwise be produced and that, unlike traditional affordable housing programs, it does not require direct public subsidies and produces affordable units in a geographically dispersed pattern." 76 However, there is overwhelming evidence that restrictive land use regulations, such as inclusionary zoning policies, have actually contributed to higher housing prices and therefore less affordable housing.
77
By constraining the supply in jurisdictions that adopt inclusionary zoning policies, many economists and developers believe that such policies impose "additional costs on new residential development" that result in increasing housing prices. 78 Therefore, while the argument exists for forcing developers to include affordable units in new developments, the results speak otherwise.
Descriptive statistics regarding inclusionary zoning policies reveal that there is considerable diversity in the structure and characteristics of these programs around the country. Thus, these inclusionary polices "contribute to increased sales prices of existing singlefamily homes during rising regional markets, and may depress local housing prices when regional prices decline." 81 So while inclusionary zoning policies have the ability to reduce local housing prices and make units in depressed housing markets more affordable, they should not be seen as a total solution to the problem but rather as a potential hinderance to increasing the overall housing supply that could ultimately result in a tenable solution. While these policies do still serve a purpose in a possible solution, their overall ineffectiveness towards curtailing the problem should highlight that reliance on these policies as an ultimate solution is ill-advised.
B. Tax Abatements
In many declining communities, local governments have proffered taxbased incentives to try and curtail the problem of urban decline. One of these tax-based incentives is residential property tax abatement programs. The logic behind these abatement programs is that "[a]batements as subsidies are expected to change consumers' locational choices through the availability of higher-quality homes at lower overall prices."
82
In Cleveland, Ohio, the city promoted an abatement program that was designed to promote job growth and foster new residential development. The abatements extended to new construction residents for 100% of the value of the new residences and thus only made home owners responsible for the taxes that were attributable to the value of land, which was established as 20% of the sale price of the new home.
83
For rehabilitation projects, the abatements were extended to the full value of the improvements of more than $5,000.
84
A study of these abatement programs, however, found that the abatements were unable to influence the economic decline of the city and "did not create the scale of changes needed Thus, it was ultimately concluded that residential property tax abatement programs can assist in overall job creation and "the formation of new companies" in declining areas of a community, but "substantial changes in median household income, employment levels, tax receipts for local governments, and the removal of blighted conditions lie in a robust economy propelled by new jobs and new companies." 86 Similar to inclusionary zoning, tax abatement programs for residential properties are not a driver of nor a substitute for true economic development that can sustain a market of all types of housing.
C. Tax Increment Financing (TIF)
On the development-financing side of local government tax-based incentives, tax increment financing (TIF) is the most widely used program for fostering economic development in the United States.
87
The theory behind TIF is that the revenue growth generated from new development "will pay for physical infrastructure and other expenditures designed to spur further economic growth" within the developing area.
88
TIF laws vary by state, but the basic idea is that a territorial district is created within a city, and a base valuation of all the properties within that district is determined with property taxes being assessed based on the base value of each property.
89
Revenues derived from the taxes within that district are then directly set aside "to be used for public improvements and other economic development programs within the district." 90 TIF-generated funds can be used for numerous purposes within the district, including the maintenance and construction of physical infrastructure such as "streets and street lighting, curbs and sidewalk improvements, bridges and roads, water mains and supply, and sewage removal," as well as for parks and planning upgrades. Local government use of TIFs carries with it the explicit goal of increasing the tax base of a district, but they do not necessarily prioritize increasing the number of quality jobs or the amount of affordable housing.
93
Fiscalization policies like TIFs have been "sharply criticized by those who would like to refocus local planning and development policies on other goals, like job creation, improved service delivery, affordable housing, or preservation of quality of life."
94
To reform TIF programs, some advocates have urged that local governments require a percentage of TIF Funds be dedicated to the creation of affordable housing. 95 So, in their current existence and practice, TIFs do little to create affordable housing, but still assist in redeveloping areas to potentially entice further development.
D. Tax Credits
Many tax credit projects involve substantial renovations of older government housing projects that "are occupied by households with tenantbased housing vouchers that provide owners with additional revenue."
96
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is "the largest and fastest growing housing program" in the United States and it is designed to subsidize "the construction and renovation of more units each year than all other government programs combined." 97 However, while local governments frequently use tax credits, their effectiveness towards contributing to a solution to the affordable housing problem is uncertain.
In Thus, the problem clearly is not supply in terms of the mass quantity of housing produced in a year, but rather a supply problem within the affordable subsections of the market on the housing-price-spectrum that is certainly lacking. For perspective, the argument for increasing supply to solve the lack of affordable housing in this country is not focused on the aggregate quantity of housing produced but instead attempts to articulate a position where increasing the supply of housing in the affordable brackets of the housing-price-spectrum (rather than on the luxury end as is the current trend) is heavily encouraged.
These current tools local governments employ to incentivize development are failing to encourage an increase in supply in affordable housing that is necessary to correct the spread of urban decline and to promote redevelopment of local communities. The current model does not work and is simply exacerbating the elimination of affordable housing all across the country. Instead, if local governments focused on using underutilized tools in their possession instead of relying on tools such as eminent domain, and coupled those initiatives with market-based solutions, then the necessary reform on the housing market and the reintroduction of development of affordable units into the marketplace for consumers can be possible.
IV. GOVERNMENT-SIDE SOLUTIONS TO THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROBLEM
A. Overview
" [S] olutions that move beyond the debate over 'public use' versus 'public purpose' must be studied if cities are to address the need for affordable housing . . . ."
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Since Kelo was decided in 2005, government-side solutions to the affordable housing problem have been all over the board with little consensus over which methods best curtail the problem. The likely reason is that many of these solutions, addressed above, simply do not do anything to solve the problem but rather only assist to stopgap the dilemma for a temporary period. Today, current legal scholarship on the issue of affordable housing seemingly works under the supposition that the government is the solver of all ills and is therefore best suited to solve this problem once and for all. The following sections detail some of the different government-side solutions that have been proposed in recent years.
B. Exclusionary & Inclusionary Eminent Domain
Exclusionary eminent domain occurs "when a taking leads to the loss of affordable housing and the displacement of residents from one neighborhood to another."
101
Under the exclusionary eminent domain doctrine, legal scholars propose that "if a municipality did not substitute the low-income housing that is condemned for the public purpose of economic redevelopment, then the taking is unlawful, and the government may not exercise eminent domain."
102
Essentially, for this doctrine to be deemed legal, municipalities must provide equitable substitute affordable housing to low-income residents displaced by the exercise of eminent domain. Through this "[h]eightened judicial review," the proposed exclusionary eminent domain doctrine seeks to rectify what many see as an abuse of the takings clause which was promulgated by the Supreme Court in Kelo.
Under the concept of inclusionary eminent domain, "the incentive for developers, primarily, is public support and community cooperation, which sometimes is the key to a lucrative return on the condemnation of the land anticipated for development."
103
While placing "little, if any, imposition" on the courts or legislature, inclusionary eminent domain sets out to encourage "a constructive, three-way engagement process and partnership among the community, private developer and municipality. . . ."
104
The concept is meant to show "how private developers and municipalities can reconcile a development project in accordance with the needs and wants of the affected community," which include elements such as "meaningful engagement, community participation, collective action and public approval." On its face, the concept is wonderful in an altruistic sense. However, inclusionary eminent domain operates under two incorrect assertions. The first incorrect assertion is that developers are willing to prioritize the attitudes of the community over their potential return on investment. Generally, developers do not prioritize the attitudes of the community over their projects unless it affects the willingness of local governments to approve their projects or potential renters/buyers from leasing/buying the result of their projects. Therefore, to assert that developers are willing to engage in a "three-way engagement process and partnership" with local communities is likely mistaken. Willing they would not be, but forced, they may be. This goes against the whole basis of the inclusionary concept by including developers not through their own subjective intent, but by holding their feet to the fire if they want to make a living.
The second incorrect assertion is that municipalities and private developers would, generally, be willing to internalize more costs associated with a project without being forced to by courts or legislatures. Inclusionary eminent domain "encourage municipalities and private developers to internalize some of the social costs involved in the taking of land without the imposition of affirmative obligations from the courts or the legislature."
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In the face of a multi-million dollar development, to assert that developers should be willing to internalize even more costs than they already have to is, again, operating under the assumption that it is fair to force a developers to do this for the benefit of lower-income groups at the potential expense of their business. Such an assumption is anything but inclusionary on the developers end. While altruistic in theory, inclusionary eminent domain conceptualizes meaningful elements that may very well prove valuable in solving the affordable housing problem. However, like so many other theories conceptualizing different ways to use the power of eminent domain, the theory fails by making the developers the ones to suffer the burdens associated with displacement-simply shifting the problem from lowincome residents to developers without even trying to eliminate it altogether. 
C. Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs)
Often the complications that can be generated by a local government's eminent domain practice "stem from the confluence of various business and corporate interests that have influence over government when it carries out its authority," 107 usually at the cost of the displacement of low-income residents. "The results of the exercise of the eminent domain authority can lead to the leveling of large segments of communities, the loss of affordable housing, the loss of small businesses, and the destruction of neighborhood and community social infrastructure. . . ."
108
Broad acceptance of neoliberal policies at the local level favors unfettered entrepreneurialism, unencumbered free markets, and individual private property rights over collective aspirations.
109
However, what is often ignored by such policies is the "distinction between use values and exchange values, and the fact that the benefits derived from the pursuit of exchange values by intensive development are unevenly distributed across the community." 110 Thus, the disparate impact is magnified as typically the "citizens/residents most affected by the economic development decisions [of local government] often have little opportunity through democratic channels to participate in the decision-making process that is affecting their community." 111 Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) are legally enforceable contracts, signed by community groups and by a developer, that lay out a range of community benefits that the developer has agreed to provide to the community as part of a development project in exchange for the community's support for the project.
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In the context of affordable housing, for community advocates and local governments, CBAs can be incredibly useful to "enhance opportunities for low-income and working-class communities within the context of urban development and revitalization." developers, CBAs can be beneficial because they can act as "a promise of support" which could help "developers negotiate state subsidies and maintain good public relations."
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However, putting so much faith in the willingness of developers to prioritize public support may be unwise if doing so comes at the cost of losing on their bottom-line.
While CBAs can work to promote community interests, the flaw in the existing CBA model "is that it may fail to galvanize a broad and diverse cross-section of the community as stakeholders and participants in the decision-making process."
115
This becomes a fatal flaw in the current promotion of CBAs towards solving issues of inclusiveness in the housing market through affordable housing because in order to achieve inclusiveness, CBAs "must have a broad coalition of organizations with demands that bring some weight to the negotiation table with municipalities and private developers." 116 Thus, if efforts to establish such a broad coalition fail, the community advocate's negotiating power is significantly reduced, and questions of the willingness of developers to enter into such binding agreements should be raised.
History has shown that, "accountability has been a problem" 117 with CBAs. This could demonstrate why CBAs are not influencing developers but are acting as hinderances to a free market for development. Legally binding developers to enact benefits for the community is again a potential destructive model towards encouraging free development by again holding developers' feet to the fire. Nonetheless, the implicit goal of CBAs of increasing community participation and involvement still should be able to assist in a solution to the shortage of affordable housing. CBAs are ultimately designed to be an input mechanism for community stakeholders, but in order to have a say in the process, placing such binding constraints on developers may not be the best solution. Instead, local governments should be the ones accountable for the failure of developers to initiate developments that meet the needs of their communities.
D. Redevelopment Authorities and Community Development Corporations (CDCs)
One current tool that helps local governments better serve their communities and obtain the benefits sought in new developments are Redevelopment Authorities. Typically based within distinct geographic areas like cities or counties, Redevelopment Authorities are authorized agencies within local governments given the public powers of the government to promote development.
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While in theory designed to be an intermediary between local government, developers, and community shareholders, Redevelopment Authorities have frequently put the neoliberal economic initiatives of the local governments and developers before the collective interests of the community. And while supposed to work autonomously from the local government that empowered them, local Redevelopment Authorities have become entwined with the economic initiatives of the local government such as job creation or expanding the community's tax base, 119 all the while becoming scapegoats for the government when community advocates feel as if those initiatives are not in-line with the benefits they hope new developments will provide to the community.
Community Development Corporations (CDCs) are "nonprofit entities that seek to improve economically depressed inner-city neighborhoods with, among other things, affordable housing to recreate the social fabric of distressed areas."
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As nonprofits, CDCs are completely independent from local governments. Therefore, unlike Redevelopment Authorities, CDCs are more adequately attuned to the concerns of community stakeholders and care little about economic initiatives. Also, while being independent from the local government, they provide a private means of fostering redevelopment without the use of public power or public money. Instead of relying on local government tax money, "CDCs combine several sources of equity and debt to construct economic development projects." 121 While operating autonomously from local government, CDCs hold the power to work with developers as business partners rather than as a quasi-governmental organization applying governmental leverage on developers to comply with certain requirements. Thus, CDCs hold the power to economically persuade developers to acquire land and then quickly "resell the properties to the community at a discount [,] or to buy the land and immediately sell it to the CDC so it can construct affordable housing with its investments." 122 This, however, is not the only model to which CDCs can work with local developers. Alternatively, developers can "negotiate a long-term lease to build new affordable housing structures with the affected community," and the CDC, "on behalf of the affected community, would pay the developer the property rent."
123
By taking local government out of the equation, a better relationship between developers and the local community can grow through economic incentives that are free from government entanglements. CDCs can effectively bring local community advocates to the table of government discussions on new developments not as a disadvantaged group but instead as an economic partner to the development. While not affording governmental protections and potentially making community members susceptible to economic risks, CDCs are by no means a total solution to the problem. Nevertheless, CDCs are likely the best means by which local governments can assist communities in solving the affordable housing problem by removing themselves from the negotiation table and promoting, empowering, and educating their citizens as to the potential benefits from organizing a community CDC.
While these government-side solutions cannot and should not claim to be the be-all-end-all solution to the affordable housing problem in the United States, they still are incredibly useful solutions to assist in solving the problem if coupled with market-based solutions that incentivize supply through all sections of the housing-price-spectrum. As previously articulated, many legal scholars "think the proper line to [housing reform] is to require new developments to save a proportion of units for low-income residents, which will ensure, they claim, 'that economically diverse neighborhoods and housing affordability will be preserved for generations to come. '" 125 Free market economists, however, would argue, " [t] he implicit assumption behind this position is that government agents have enough information to organize complex social institutions, when in fact they are slow to respond to changes in market conditions and are often blissfully unaware of the many strategies that are needed in different market settings." 126 Due to this incorrect assumption, many economists articulate that the alternative view is to "abandon the assumption that there is a systematic market failure requiring government intervention" and to "remove all barriers to entry in the housing market, so that supply can increase and prices can fall."
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These barriers "include an endless array of fees, taxes, and permits that grant vast discretionary authority to local officials." 128 Thus, in the end, it is likely that the "removal of these burdens will allow [society] to harness the private knowledge of developers who will seek to work in those portions of the market that hold the greatest profit opportunities."
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Critics of this free market approach and many legal scholars alike, often fear that "developers will look to build only mansions and high-rise towers 124 Adam Hengels, Urban [ism] 
